Labour’s Big Sell-out on Defence

Note: this speech by Lieutenant-General Jonathon Riley was delivered alongside slides which do not feature here.

The current Labour government’s latest move in foreign and defence policy is a wholly ideological one: its desire to tie Britain back into at least part of the EU, by concluding a pact on foreign affairs, defence and defence industry with Brussels. This pact is not an organisation for mutual strategic benefit, like NATO, but a mechanism to make the UK subject to the orders of the EU Commission on foreign affairs and defence policy. The pact is, as far as the EU is concerned, a carbon copy of that proposed by Theresa May in 2018-2019 and therefore everything that was in it and at risk then is at risk once more.

The current government is pushing hard for a ‘re-set’ with the EU, using the completion of this defence and foreign affairs pact as the vehicle. There will be intense negotiations in the coming months. The problem, of course, is what has to be conceded. Labour is essentially using the same plan as was proposed by the Tories in 2018 under Teresa May. This proved so unpopular that it had to be abandoned and removed from the exit negotiations. However, the landscape has changed and reviving this plan will place the UK in a far deeper commitment on foreign affairs and defence than it ever agreed to while a member of the EU. Why is this? Because the EU Commission’s powers have been expanded to include the control of funding for defence and foreign affairs, and it has also taken on the management of the work to create joint defence capabilities.

A pact that follows the same general template as the Theresa May plan would see the UK as a non-voting, but subordinate, participant in a giant new EU defence architecture. A giant in terms of military capability it is not, but it is a giant in terms of the political mechanisms designed to steer policy, determine spending and control all that sovereign member states have done for themselves, while remaining accountable to their people, until now. Indeed, the pact is so deeply wound up with EU policy that it will inevitably lead to the UK being dragged back into EU Treaty texts governing defence and foreign policy. It is absolutely the theft of our sovereignty, in which Theresa May in 2019 and Keir Starmer today are complicit.

The defence of any country and the means to conduct that defence are essential attributes of sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot be delegated, relegated or divided – if it is, it is lost. This is the first and most essential factor in understanding why handing control of our national defence to the EU is a catastrophic risk. If we hand over our defence, we risk losing our sovereignty and ceasing to be a country at all. If you do not believe me, perhaps the words of Professor Sir Michael Howard might touch a chord. Armed forces, if I may paraphrase him, are one of the essential attributes of statehood and no proper country can do without them, for they define how other nations view you and how they treat you.

Inevitably, joining this pact means that the UK will have to abide by EU Commission rules and strategies, and contribute to EU funds, as if we had never left the EU, at least in the realms of defence and foreign affairs. The pact would be sealed into the existing EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, meaning that the EU Commission would be able to use trade or legal sanctions to enforce our participation; it would also mean that getting out of it will mean ditching the entire Agreement at some point in the future – or at least threatening to do so in the event of non-cooperation with a future Brexit-minded government. As with so much in the EU, everything is connected to everything else, meaning one must take all or nothing. It was nothing for which the British people voted decisively in the Referendum of 2016 and the General Election of 2019.

Pursuing the path of an EU Pact – effectively trying to circumvent the will of the majority as expressed in the Referendum – will anger many people. However, Ministers seem not to care about the consequences, for they have been given their orders by the EU Commission and appear to have no interest in the notion of accountability to their own people. What they care about is achieving this major objective in their term of office, not seeming to understand that the whole thing CAN be overturned in the future. And at some point, the media, which is either supine or, like the BBC, in favour of this sell-out, will wake up as it did when Teresa May tried this one in 2018. Then, after a quiet period, grass-roots campaigners exposed the consequences of the deal, and politicians and the media had to take notice. It was eventually cut out in Johnson’s ‘Future Partnership’ arrangements.

We know that Starmer’s proposed pact will use May’s template because the former EU Commissioner, Javier Serrano, has confirmed this in recorded discussions in September 2024. Then, a senior representative of the EU External Action Service, who is also a former top official in the development of the EU’s defence architecture, told a crowd at the Labour Party Conference that the pact would use the ‘same template’ as the Political Declarations of 2018 and 2019. Labour ministers have been more guarded, especially on the matter of the commitment of funds. However, Labour is already making it crystal clear that they have taken on the Theresa May deal – they criticised Boris Johnson for dropping it – and although the only admissions about what is actually in the pact have come from EU sources, we already know Labour’s intentions. For now, though, there is no sign of a Green Paper, a White Paper (except one from the EU which I will come to shortly), or any sort of debate on the matter. So, what exactly are we likely to see?

First, Labour will sign what the EU calls an Association Agreement, which places the UK into three of the EU’s internal military structures: the European Defence Agency, the European Defence Fund and the Permanent Structured Cooperation, or PESCO. Doing this accepts the principle that the UK will subject its policies and actions to scrutiny by a foreign body, an EU Commission-directed Defence Union – which surely is not acceptable?

Since these structures are based on EU rules, texts and sections of treaties, to which the UK as a non-EU state is not subject, the Agreement would have to replace these with a range of new defence and foreign policy commitments. This is an essential step for any non-EU state willing to become an Associated State. These arrangements are published on-line so anyone with the time and patience can see just how onerous they are, and how these commitments erode the autonomy of a sovereign state: under the Common Security and Defence Policy it is clear that once in, disagreement with EU decisions or trying to impede them is difficult if not impossible – and there is no reciprocal commitment to uphold the UK’s sovereign interests.

Only one other non-EU state has so far chosen to give away its sovereignty like this – Norway: a country which is, to all intents and purposes, without armed forces of its own anyway. However, Switzerland’s participation in the PESCO project known as ‘Military Mobility’ has been approved by the EU Council of Ministers. The Swiss are actually not full participants as they have an administrative arrangement which is not legally binding, because of their commitment to neutrality. The Swiss do not, therefore, have to abide by onerous ‘third state’ rules to which the EU and Labour wish to impose on the UK, because they do not participate in PESCO. Food for thought, perhaps?

Let me go into a bit more detail on these three internal military arrangements. Some have claimed that these are merely international platforms for industrial cooperation. However, once inside these arrangements, everything is compulsory, as the rules of membership are highly legalistic and underpinned by reams of EU legal text which lay down the requirements placed on states, the policies to be followed and the amounts they must pay in contributions. Joining all these structures would tie our defence and defence industries to the EU’s rules and policies for defence, and indeed foreign policy. Thus, under EU law – the ruling jurisdiction – we would be structurally, politically, diplomatically and financially tied in to and subordinated to the defence architecture of an unaccountable body, the EU Commission. And be in no doubt, attachment to any part of the EU’s defence integration scheme subordinates the country, by EU law, to the whole of the EU’s global strategy.

 In November, the EU Commission announced that it would update the 20 Binding Commitments which form the basis of PESCO. These commitments, rather than its projects, are the foundation of PESCO. These range from a commitment to increase defence spending in real terms; to increasing collaborative projects, development and capabilities; cooperation in the virtual realm, supporting CARD – the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence -; involvement in and commitment to the EDF and EDA; and funding, supporting and contributing to EU deployments. Streamlining the commitments will not mean less control or more freedom – probably the reverse. A re-working of the Binding Commitments will also lead automatically to a reworking of the Participation Rules for non-EU States, ie Norway, Switzerland and the UK. In February, the European Defence Agency began using even tougher language against ‘national preference’, i.e, preventing states from prioritising their domestic defence industries.

PESCO is particularly binding, but I do not intend to take you through the full text of PESCO, you can read it yourselves, but I do want to alert you to at least some of the major consequences of signing up. PESCO requires members and Third State – i.e. non-member states that sign up to the Pact – to state that they prioritise a European collaborative approach, which may or may not be aligned with the UK’s interests or democratic system. Where would such a carte blanche handover to the EU leave us in a major dispute over, say, Gibraltar? Or the Sovereign Base Areas of Cyprus? Or even the Falkands? The same is true about any dispute with an EU state, or the EU Commission, over intellectual property or copyright, or patents brought by the Third State – which are under the rules invalidated. In effect, the UK is prohibited from taking any action against that state or the EU Commission. PESCO gives the EU Commission the right to take measures against the UK, however, if, in its judgement, the UK has not made a positive commitment to the European defence industrial base – whatever that may mean. The consequences of all that, given the size of the UK’s defence industry, are huge.

But once signed up to PESCO, the binding commitments act as a legal and political framework ‘towards a Common Defence’. This of course means full military unification and differs in that respect from the Common Security and Defence Policy. Following this, PESCO is a route towards a ‘full spectrum force package’ for the EU Commission, as a tool in its global strategy. PESCO also endorses a situation where the EU military Staff, the EU External Action Service and other CSDP structures can assess the UK’s compliance and participation.

This directly erodes our national sovereignty and our membership of NATO, imposing rules on investment and collaborative capability development – nothing wrong with collaboration, but everything wrong with interference from unaccountable bodies. Effectively, it is up to the EU Commission to fulfil capability gaps, using the European Defence Agency and the European Defence Fund, rather than national requirements or NATO being the vehicles for this. The creation of an EU Navy, Army or Air Force is, I have to say, unlikely in the short to medium term at least, because many EU member states are against it – it is perhaps a smokescreen for what really matters, which I will come to later.

PESCO, the European Defence Agency and the European Defence Fund are thus intended to create a European ‘Defence Union’, to use the Commission’s own words, rather than rely on cooperation or shared defence responsibilities between nations which are enduring characteristics of NATO. The EU Defence Union is about integrating every aspect of defence, including budgeting, procurement, development, the roles of the armed forces, training and exercises, and finally deployments. This will apply even if the Commission is unable to create unified armed forces subordinate to their orders. All these have until now been sovereign government responsibilities, for which government remains accountable to those who vote and pay taxes. These arrangements would do away with that. In addition, it seems likely that Britain would be disbarred from holding any command positions, or providing any headquarters, or acting as a framework nation during operations – just to provide troops, ships and aircraft, assuming Labour leaves us any after continuing the destruction wrought by the Tories.

Moving on from PESCO, this slide shows the governance of the European Defence Fund, or EDF, given clearance on 18 April 2019. This is the central financial pillar of the EU’s structures for defence. It currently holds only a relatively modest budget, but it works by leveraging nations’ resources through policy compliance – members having to agree to abide by the EU’s rules – and also by making grants to encourage sovereign nations to make changes to their defence budgets that further align them to the centre. This slide shows how the EU currently runs the EDF, over-riding national authorities.

Next, the governance of CARD – the Coordinated Annual Review of Defence – which strengthens the leverage of the EU over national decision-making.

The governance of wider EU defence procurement is shown here, and it links CARD and the EDF to PESCO, the latter by the use of a premium from the EDF for joint programmes within the EU; and also with the EU’s Capability Development Plan (CDP) which sets priorities; and the Capability Development Mechanism (CDM). All these are parts of the wider structure to which the UK would have been bound by the Political Declaration of 2019, and to which the current Labour front bench has indicated its commitment.

Involvement in this wider set of structures is made obligatory by joining the named structures of EDA, PESCO and EDF; and in the case of the CSDP and CFSP, the necessary level of commitment is described in PESCO rules as a series of commitments to non-divergence. The Proposed Pact is not therefore a sort of defence club, but a power grab which affects not only the armed forces and intelligence services, but also defence industries. 

Thus, everything is linked to everything else – and the EU has given itself multiple levels of influence over defence and security:

  1. CSDP
  2. EDA
  3. EDF
  4. CARD
  5. CDP
  6. CDM
  7. PESCO

You can see those eight levels of control shown as pillars, ironically ranged alongside partnership with the NATO and UN as laid out in Article 42.1 of the EU Treaty, which together build the EU global defence and security policy, as put into effect through the European Defence Union.

The EU Commission is not elected, British voters cannot change it at the polling booth, and yet the government is prepared to compromise its control over its first duty – the defence of its people, territory and vital interests – to the EU. Labour seeks to make us in effect a voiceless, rule-taking colony of Brussels. This pact is therefore all about how an unaccountable body seizes control over the budgets and resources of sovereign member states; this is because the real power in these structures is not just how much money they are themselves allocated from EU funds, but how much the EU Commission can leverage from the allocation of those funds, and by what means.

It must be a matter of serious concern that some in our civil service simply do not understand how dangerous these mechanisms are, although in many cases they are fully aware and committed to them. That in itself is alarming, but far more alarming is the fact that moves towards tying Britain into EU foreign policy and defence have not received any sort of proper scrutiny from elected members of Parliament.

So, the equipment, training, deployment and employment of national armed forces are no longer solely the business of elected governments. The EU Institutions will place themselves in a position of authority, heavily to influence the deployment of, or decisions concerning, British soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines in harm’s way, without accountability for the consequences. So much for democracy, and so much for sovereignty.

Worse still, this takes away resources from the one organisation which really matters in terms of defence: NATO. NATO remains an organisation of sovereign states, founded on a treaty, with mutual commitments and guarantees, including those to its latest members, Finland and Sweden. Its administrative organs remain just that: The Secretary General and his staff have no powers or responsibilities for the deployment or employment of nations’ armed forces, nor do they lay down rules on what to buy. NATO has developed doctrine and procedures to enhance interoperability; and it has command and control structures to which, for operations or exercises, nations assign forces under various levels of authority. But nations remain responsible and accountable to their people for the consequences of doing those things. Recent American language at the Munich Security Conference, putting Europe on notice to defend itself and not rely on the US umbrella, has of course encouraged the EU Commission and others to turn up the volume on the creation of European armed forces outwith national controls. Poland’s defence minister, Radoslaw Sikorski, unsurprisingly said no to that idea – but it will not stop the French and the EU Commission from pushing ahead. One major obstruction will be the German Constitution and Germany should perhaps remind itself that subjecting its armed forces to the control of the EU Commission will entail the breach of its Constitution and therefore its sovereignty.

Under the existing EU Treaty, member states are bound by Article 42.7, which is similar to NATO’s Article 5 in that it obliges members to render mutual aid to any other member if attacked. Member states are also expected to prepare for such an eventuality. All members except Malta are already in PESCO’s binding commitments, so they are doing that anyway. However, in February, EU foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, speaking at the European Space Conference, announced that the EU Commission has unilaterally extended the trigger for Article 42.7 to include an attack on space assets – ie satellites, space stations and space vehicles. Currently, Article 42.7 speaks of member states ‘territory’ not assets – so this is a precedent that could be applied anywhere. It will be interesting to see how EU member states prepare for that.

Using the possibility of a reduced US military presence in Europe – upon which, let’s face it, European countries have free-loaded for decades, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen unveiled the latest attempt to push through an integrated EU military structure in the ‘ReArm Europe’ initiative on 25 February. This new ‘tool’ as it is described, involves EU nations increasing defence spending by 1.5% of GDP to raise Eu 650bn over four years, with another Eu 150 bn coming from Eurobonds. On the credit side, the ReArm Europe programme does address the issue of capabilities rather than simply percentages of GDP – in particular drones, missiles and integrated air defence.

The plan involves five major instruments:

  • States will be able to remove defence expenditure from the EU excess deficit procedure
  • The Eu 150bn loan
  • Redirecting ‘cohesion’ funds to defence [NB used for environmental programmes and cross-border transport infrastructure projects]
  • Enhancing the role of the European Investment Bank [NB, previously mainly focused on development, infrastructure and environmental programmes]
  • Mobilising private finance [whatever that means]

The plan has already run into trouble in the Netherlands, where the Parliament has rejected it in spite of its being approved unanimously by all EU member states, as they clearly understand that this is a further attempt to undermine national sovereignty by using scare tactics.

Keir Starmer, on the other hand, according to a report in The Daily Telegraph on 18 March, is pushing for British defence industry to be classified as ‘European’: able to access the market, true, but also tying Britain more closely into the EU’s structures. Some EU countries – Poland, the Netherlands and the Baltics – have signalled support, but France is opposed, possibly because EU countries buy almost 80% of their equipment from outside the bloc; the latest proposals would make it all but impossible for EU members to buy defence equipment from the US – and indeed Britain until and unless we join the structures. France would like this, being as she is the world’s second-largest arms exporter, after the US as it would place her in pole position to be the EU’s main arms supplier. But why should our Parliament consent to what is presented as a binary choice between the EU and the rest? Surely British industry should be free to compete wherever and whenever it can and not least to serve our own needs before those of others.

The EU, actually, needs British expertise and experience in defence, and especially in defence industry for research and development of next generation weapons. In spite of their rhetoric, the French know this and would like to tie the UK into the EU structures, because we would lose decision-making autonomy over foreign policy, defence policy and especially defence industrial policy – to their benefit as they see things.

This is the real issue: that the Eu seeks to centralise control over defence industry, including the control of where those industries are located and what they manufacture: British sites could therefore be closed and their output and jobs moved elsewhere. This is bad for our economy, but far worse for our ability to manufacture the means of our own defence.

Just for comparison with the Eu 850 bn, or $870 bn over four years, UK defence budget for those same four years would amount to around £220 bn, or $285 bn without any increases other than for inflation, a significant amount and no wonder a target for the EU Commission to harness; the Russian defence budget would be somewhere between £330 and $400bn – but the Russians through various means always get a bigger ‘bang’ for their ‘buck’ than we do; and the US budget $4 trillion, or $4,000, 000,000.

UK defence industry is estimated to contribute more than £38 bn to the economy overall, employing 147,000 people and another 110,000 in secondary areas.

These figures should make any British government sit up and take notice, because of the enormous overmatch of spending by the US and its vital significance to NATO. The USA brings capabilities to NATO that no-one else has, and no-one else will ever afford. Capabilities that make NATO formidable and keep us safe: a major withdrawal by the US under Trump will, be in no doubt, expose us all to greater threats and our current government should care deeply about this, rather than putting its hopes on a European defence identity that lacks the power of NATO with US leadership and which hands control of our spending to an unaccountable body.

One example of the power of the US is air defence. The US deploys 11 carrier battlegroups around the world, with another three under construction; each of these carries more combat aircraft than the RAF possesses. There are also land-based aircraft, 15 Patriot battalions with four batteries of eight launchers per battalion (we and the rest of Europe have none), and 8 lower-level SHORAD battalions – we have one, equipped with outdated missiles. But the US also brings bulk in terms of armoured formations on land, offensive air at the tactical and operational level, and surface and sub-surface naval forces. Labour, however, or so it seems, cannot stand the thought of US leadership and in particular a leadership embodied in Donald Trump and Elon Musk. Thus, the insane threats to cut off intelligence cooperation under the Five Eyes arrangement (US, UK, Canada, Australia and NZ), which has served us, and its other members, so well. The EU and some European nations have hated this for years and would give anything to see it destroyed. Doing so would give Starmer huge credit in their eyes, while opening the UK to threats from around the world without the warnings provided under Five Eyes.

Therefore, in my view, every effort should be made to keep the US closely involved in NATO – which of course means stopping the free-loading on the US and becoming once more proper , capable and credible partners as we were during the Cold War. But that is not the same thing as handing over our sovereignty.

The most recent EU move is the publication of the ‘white paper’, by the Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, released through the office of Kaja Kallas. The Kabilius paper talks about building the defence union in Europe which is the object of the Common Security and Defence Policy, and appears to incorporate Ukraine – a dangerous liability as things stand. Its release has been delayed because the EU Commission has been focused on finding money to support Ukraine, but the delay allows the Commission to adjust its messaging alongside Trump’s peace proposals – and to allow the announcement of the new financial EU instrument, the Regulation establishing the Security Action For Europe (SAFE) through the reinforcement of the ReArm defence industry Instrument I mentioned earlier.

The joke is that Starmer is pitching for membership of the Pact, partially on the ground that the UK is still a major player in defence, that can take a serious part in facing Russia’s 30+ combat divisions, 2,800 tanks, 5,000 infantry fighting vehicles, 2,000 guns, 1,300 rocket systems and all the rest of Putin’s gear. The last defence review cut 10,000 men from the army, reduced the fleet of main battle tanks to less than 200, and cast aside the entire Warrior armoured vehicle fleet leaving us with no armoured infantry capability.  We cannot put even a single armoured division into the field for a serious war, and if we tried, the troops would be equipped with vehicles between 30 and 60 years old, outgunned and obsolescent, lacking in air defence and without the supplies of spare parts and ammunition needed to keep it in the field.

Our air force is down to 15 squadrons – only 170 combat aircraft as against nearly 800 Russian and with no ground-based air defence; our navy has closed in on aircraft carriers when it needs cruisers, frigates, destroyers, inshore small craft in large numbers, and submarines. Do we need aircraft carriers? Maybe – but we live on a very large aircraft carrier parked off the European coast. If you accept the proposition I mentioned earlier, from Sir Michael Howard, then our armed forces are so small and incapable that no-one, friend or foe, can take us seriously except for the fact of our nuclear deterrent. In the depths of the last Cold War, we spent more than 5% of our GDP on defence and that is, rightly, what the Americans are suggesting is needed once more. Today, our defence budget it is said to be 2.3%, but that disguises the fact that, unlike during the Cold War, the defence budget has to pay for the nuclear deterrent as well as service pensions and a hefty chunk of foreign aid, dressed up as ‘defence diplomacy’. Without those items our real spending is probably 1.8% or less. That puts our spending 23rd out of 32 in NATO in terms of GDP, although not in terms of volume.

The Americans have put us on notice to spend more on defence and repair the damage of the last thirty years. You may not know that the US Army has provided an example here, by identifying 17 major capability gaps, brought about by neglect or the conversion of conventional assets for counterinsurgency, that need to be repaired. This is a highly important point, because talk of figures such as percentages of GDP are meaningless unless they are tied to the generation of capabilities – the one point I can find in favour of the EU’s ReArm proposals. As I said earlier, we may have to look at capabilities that currently, only the US has – in air defence, drones, aviation, and long range artillery, for example. And of course, this means defence cooperation and collaboration, and agreed common procurement plans to cut costs – but that is not the same as handing over control of our national assets.

So, what will be the timetable? We have already seen the appointment of Sir Oliver Robbins as PUS in the FCDO. Starmer needs Robbins as he understands the requirements of any pact. His former subordinate, Alastair Brockbank, is already a senior member of the Cabinet Office EU Relations team under Nick Thomas-Symonds – a surrender squad if ever I saw one. On 3 February, the EU Council met to discuss defence, a meeting to which Starmer was not formally invited, although he joined the others for dinner. 2025 is the year that the EU Commission and Council will enact the Strategic Compass and complete the EU Defence Union, ahead of the negotiations at the end of the year for the next EU Budget.

So, what can you do? First, Awareness. Ensure that MPs and Lords are aware that they have missed the scale of the breach of their duties and their powers. Brief the media whenever possible. Post your opinions online and in social media.

Secondly, Alternatives. My friend and colleague Gwythian Prins, along with Sir Richard Dearlove and Field Marshal Lord Guthrie wrote an alternative: a draft treaty between the UK and the EU for defence, security and intelligence cooperation consequent on our departure from the EU. They published it on 29 March 2019 and it is founded on cooperation, not integration.

Third, Action. Please tell everyone you can about what is being done to us and our security. Please lobby MPs, or if you are an MP, demand proper scrutiny. Lobby the MOD too. Our elected politicians MUST be made to remember that, unlike the EU Commission, they ARE accountable to the people of this country. It is wrong therefore for them to allow what amount to fundamental changes in the sovereignty of our country – in or out of the EU – without such changes being subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, so that the government is not able to sign up to EU policies or laws unless they have been deposited in Parliament and until the committees of both Houses have completed their scrutiny work.

With a few awkward questions in Parliament, YOU can push the requirement for proper scrutiny. YOU can prevent this Pact going through on the nod and thus stripping our defence authority and autonomy, and the control of our armed forces and our nuclear weapons.

My final words to you are that first, nothing I have said here goes against the principle of developing, buying and selling defence materiel cooperatively to ensure better commonality between allies, and by allies I mean NATO, or to ensure value for money. Our defence industries can benefit from that, so long as the playing field is level. Secondly, that nothing I have said here means that our troops cannot take part in EU missions in the future – but they should do so on the same basis as we take part in NATO and UN missions. That is, as a sovereign nation that retains full command of its forces, delegating operational command or control for specific missions and tasks.

Lieutenant-General Jonathon Riley